The Military Significance of the Middlebrook Encampment
An Address Given By Dr. Mark Edward LenderRutgers UniversityJuly 4, 1976
The Continental Army: spent only a fraction of its time on the battlefield during the War for Independence, Most of the time the patriot soldiers were busy with duties at camp; and because of this, historians must consider the importance not only of where the armies fought, but also of the places where they actually lived. I think it is fair to say that we can learn as much from the encampments of the Revolutionary forces as we can from their campaigns. The Continental Army used two basic kinds of encampments. The first we might call the secure base area. This was a location where the rebel commanders could rest and train their men, collect supplies, and plan their next moves without undue fear of an enemy attack. Those camp grounds were selected carefully; for in addition to providing a haven for the Continentals, they usually also protected important patriot communications routes and sources of supply. They were not intended to be combat theaters. In fact, they were supposed to keep the army out of combat until its leaders thought that it was ready to fight. A prime example of such a post was the camp at Morristown. There, the army was generally secure within a highly patriotic area, it could protect the approaches to the crucial iron-producing areas to the north, and it could usually supply itself and train without fear of British harassment. To fight, however, Washington had to leave the shelter of northern New Jersey and move to meet the Redcoats on other ground, Morristown, then, and other campsites like it, no matter how valuable to the rebel cause in other respects, were not intended to serve as battlefields. For that, the Continentals established themselves in entirely different areas. These other grounds were advance posts in close contact with the enemy. They were invariably located in highly defensible areas – areas from which the Continentals could do any one of three things, they could attack from a position of relative strength; they could defend on strongly prepared terrain; or if they had to, they could run, retreating along protected routes back to the secure base areas from which they had come. But in any case, no matter which eventually occurred, these forward posts were selected as bases of operations, not as logistical, training, or rest areas. They existed to threaten the enemy, and, if events looked promising for Washington, to actually bring the English to battle. One of the best examples of such an advanced post is the Middlebrook campsite. Historians have long known of many of the Continental Army's activities here; but it has only been in the last decade that we have begun to learn, largely through the research efforts of Mr. Robert Boom and other interested local historians, of much of this encampment's true significance. And it was significant. I don't think it is too much to say that locating at Middlebrook represented one of the most critical moves that the Continental Army made during the War for Independence. It is now becoming apparent that it contributed to some of the most important military operations of the entire struggle. Washington first brought his army to Middlebrook in the spring of 1777. The Continental forces had just spent the winter reorganizing, equipping and training at Morristown; and the rebel command had now set themselves the task of driving the British entirely out of New Jersey as they had almost done after the Battle of Trenton and Princeton earlier; and now General Howe, Commander of the Royal Army, held only the territory between New Brunswick and Perth Amboy. All through the winter and early spring, the enemy had been bottled-up in this corridor of land by roving American regulars and militia; and as early as March, Washington had sent the New Jersey Brigade south from Morristown to begin major harassing operations against the King's troops. Finally, with the new Continental regiments recruited and with militia support rallying, Washington shifted the bulk of his men to within striking distance of General Howe. His chief position was at Middlebrook. In making this move, Washington was clearly looking for trouble. The position of the encampment, and the care taken to defend it, lead to no other conclusion, Middlebrook fulfilled all of the requirements we spoke of earlier for an advanced post: 1) it allowed the Continentals to threaten the British in New Brunswick and their lines of communication to Perth Amboy and New York. It was an ideal position from which to attack south if the opportunity presented itself. 2) The camp was in a strong defensive position--a position made even stronger by the addition of extensive fortifications. Any enemy attempt to take these heights would have come only in the face of carefully constructed walls, cleared fields of fire, and even primitive but effective explosive mines. Casualties would have been enormous. 3) Had he felt it necessary, Washington could have run. The steep terrain would have slowed even a successful British attack, and the Continentals could have escaped following the valley north toward the protection of Morristown again. In all, Middlebrook was a position ideally suited to rebel purposes. Secure in his encampment at Middlebrook, Washington proceeded to take full advantage of his position. Offensively, he aggressively harassed the British, and his subordinate commanders fought some stiff small-unit actions. Defensively, the fortifications at the encampment served as a haven for more than one patriot detachment falling back in the face of enemy pressure. At the Battle of Bound Brook, for example, in April, a Continental advance post of some 500 men was surprised by Lord Cornwallis with about 3000. They fell back to the protection of Washington, and Cornwallis did not pursue. Again, in June, the New Jersey Brigade fought a hard skirmish near Scotch Plains end then pulled back before being trapped by the British main force under Howe--and once more the enemy, who were by now frustrated by their inability to draw Washington out of Middlebrook and into a fight on their terms, dared not follow the patriots into the hills. As for the Middlebrook camp itself, it was never directly assaulted. It was too strong a position to be stormed without horrendous losses, and the British knew it. And therein lay the encampment's chief importance of the war. For in being too well defended to be easily taken, the mere posting of the American army at Middlebrook in 1777 contributed vitally toward the British loss of their colonies. The reason for this lay in the nature of British strategy for 1777. That year, the English command worked out a plan that they hoped would win the war in a single smashing campaign. Briefly, it can be described as follows: a British army under General John Burgoyne was to advance south from Canada, down the Hudson River valley to Albany, thus cutting New England off from the rest of the colonies. In the Middle Colonies, General Howe was to keep Washington busy in order to prevent him from sending any help to the patriots facing Burgoyne; and, importantly, he was to use his army to assist the Canadian invasion force in completing its mission. This task would involve moving at least part of his command north to link up with Burgoyne. With the link made, the divided colonies could be dealt with separately and the rebellion crushed piecemeal. Had it been properly executed, the plan had real possibilities. Unfortunately for the British, however, orders to the appropriate Commanders were either unclear, misinterpreted or late, and a plan requiring precise coordination went awry. Howe never sent the required help to Burgoyne, who, fighting alone, was ultimately forced to surrender at Saratoga. A major reason that Howe never sent the required aid to his fellow general was Middlebrook. For while Burgoyne was advancing from Canada, Howe had decided to attack the rebel capitol at Philadelphia. Now, a simple look at a map shows that if you hold New Brunswick the shortest way to Philadelphia is an overland march across New Jersey. Had Howe done this, he would have taken the city in plenty of time to have sent help north to Burgoyne when it became clear to everyone that the northern attack had run into real trouble. but the fact is that Howe was not free to march across the state. Had he tried, Washington could have moved south from Middlebrook, fallen on the British rear, and cut their communications with New York. Far from being the attacker, Howe could well have faced a disaster himself, much less have been in a position to help Burgoyne. From the British point of view, there were only two ways around the dilemma: drive Washington out of Middlebrook proceeding only then across New Jersey, or attack Philadelphia from the south. This second choice meant withdrawing the British army from New Jersey (which is what Washington wanted them to do anyway), loading it on transports and sailing it down the Jersey coast, up Delaware or Chesapeake Bay, and marching on the city from a point with secure lines of communication or routes of escape. Such an alternative, while feasible, was time consuming--it could be used only at the risk of taking Philadelphia too late (if they were able to take it at all) to help Burgoyne if he needed it. Nevertheless, it was the option Howe chose. Howe almost had to. His engineer officers looked into the possibility of storming Washington’s Middlebrook fortification and thus clearing the way for a march through central New Jersey. But their conclusion was definite: any such attempt would be a bloody affair indeed if Washington chose to fight instead of run. Howe, who had seen his men slaughtered when they attacked uphill at Bunker Hill in 1775, had no desire to order another such assault. And even had he wanted to make the attack, Howe knew that he could not easily replace the losses he would certainly have sustained, So, after a vein attempt, to draw the rebels out of the hills to fight on his terms, Howe made his fateful decision: in the early summer of 1777 he evacuated New Jersey and set sail for Philadelphia. The trip took the British over a month, and when in late August, Howe finally received explicit instructions to help Burgoyne, but it was too late, he was too far south to get reinforcements north in time, and he was himself facing Washington, who had marched easily from Middlebrook to contest him. Howe's decision not to attack Middlebrook, and to move south by water instead, was therefore a major factor in the defeat of Burgoyne--a defeat now recognized as the military and diplomatic turning point of the war. When asked after the campaign why he did not move on the Continental Army on the heights of Middlebrook, Lord Howe could only answer that to have done so would have been catastrophic. The loss of Burgoyne’s men far to the north was thus unattributable in large part to the posting of patriot forces in central New Jersey. Although it was never attacked, then the encampment at Middlebrook must rank as one of the most important sites left to us from the age of the American Revolution.
Address given by Mark E. LenderJuly 4, 1976
The Continental Army: spent only a fraction of its time on the battlefield during the War for Independence, Most of the time the patriot soldiers were busy with duties at camp; and because of this, historians must consider the importance not only of where the armies fought, but also of the places where they actually lived. I think it is fair to say that we can learn as much from the encampments of the Revolutionary forces as we can from their campaigns. The Continental Army used two basic kinds of encampments. The first we might call the secure base area. This was a location where the rebel commanders could rest and train their men, collect supplies, and plan their next moves without undue fear of an enemy attack. Those camp grounds were selected carefully; for in addition to providing a haven for the Continentals, they usually also protected important patriot communications routes and sources of supply. They were not intended to be combat theaters. In fact, they were supposed to keep the army out of combat until its leaders thought that it was ready to fight. A prime example of such a post was the camp at Morristown. There, the army was generally secure within a highly patriotic area, it could protect the approaches to the crucial iron-producing areas to the north, and it could usually supply itself and train without fear of British harassment. To fight, however, Washington had to leave the shelter of northern New Jersey and move to meet the Redcoats on other ground, Morristown, then, and other campsites like it, no matter how valuable to the rebel cause in other respects, were not intended to serve as battlefields. For that, the Continentals established themselves in entirely different areas. These other grounds were advance posts in close contact with the enemy. They were invariably located in highly defensible areas – areas from which the Continentals could do any one of three things, they could attack from a position of relative strength; they could defend on strongly prepared terrain; or if they had to, they could run, retreating along protected routes back to the secure base areas from which they had come. But in any case, no matter which eventually occurred, these forward posts were selected as bases of operations, not as logistical, training, or rest areas. They existed to threaten the enemy, and, if events looked promising for Washington, to actually bring the English to battle. One of the best examples of such an advanced post is the Middlebrook campsite. Historians have long known of many of the Continental Army's activities here; but it has only been in the last decade that we have begun to learn, largely through the research efforts of Mr. Robert Boom and other interested local historians, of much of this encampment's true significance. And it was significant. I don't think it is too much to say that locating at Middlebrook represented one of the most critical moves that the Continental Army made during the War for Independence. It is now becoming apparent that it contributed to some of the most important military operations of the entire struggle. Washington first brought his army to Middlebrook in the spring of 1777. The Continental forces had just spent the winter reorganizing, equipping and training at Morristown; and the rebel command had now set themselves the task of driving the British entirely out of New Jersey as they had almost done after the Battle of Trenton and Princeton earlier; and now General Howe, Commander of the Royal Army, held only the territory between New Brunswick and Perth Amboy. All through the winter and early spring, the enemy had been bottled-up in this corridor of land by roving American regulars and militia; and as early as March, Washington had sent the New Jersey Brigade south from Morristown to begin major harassing operations against the King's troops. Finally, with the new Continental regiments recruited and with militia support rallying, Washington shifted the bulk of his men to within striking distance of General Howe. His chief position was at Middlebrook. In making this move, Washington was clearly looking for trouble. The position of the encampment, and the care taken to defend it, lead to no other conclusion, Middlebrook fulfilled all of the requirements we spoke of earlier for an advanced post: 1) it allowed the Continentals to threaten the British in New Brunswick and their lines of communication to Perth Amboy and New York. It was an ideal position from which to attack south if the opportunity presented itself. 2) The camp was in a strong defensive position--a position made even stronger by the addition of extensive fortifications. Any enemy attempt to take these heights would have come only in the face of carefully constructed walls, cleared fields of fire, and even primitive but effective explosive mines. Casualties would have been enormous. 3) Had he felt it necessary, Washington could have run. The steep terrain would have slowed even a successful British attack, and the Continentals could have escaped following the valley north toward the protection of Morristown again. In all, Middlebrook was a position ideally suited to rebel purposes. Secure in his encampment at Middlebrook, Washington proceeded to take full advantage of his position. Offensively, he aggressively harassed the British, and his subordinate commanders fought some stiff small-unit actions. Defensively, the fortifications at the encampment served as a haven for more than one patriot detachment falling back in the face of enemy pressure. At the Battle of Bound Brook, for example, in April, a Continental advance post of some 500 men was surprised by Lord Cornwallis with about 3000. They fell back to the protection of Washington, and Cornwallis did not pursue. Again, in June, the New Jersey Brigade fought a hard skirmish near Scotch Plains end then pulled back before being trapped by the British main force under Howe--and once more the enemy, who were by now frustrated by their inability to draw Washington out of Middlebrook and into a fight on their terms, dared not follow the patriots into the hills. As for the Middlebrook camp itself, it was never directly assaulted. It was too strong a position to be stormed without horrendous losses, and the British knew it. And therein lay the encampment's chief importance of the war. For in being too well defended to be easily taken, the mere posting of the American army at Middlebrook in 1777 contributed vitally toward the British loss of their colonies. The reason for this lay in the nature of British strategy for 1777. That year, the English command worked out a plan that they hoped would win the war in a single smashing campaign. Briefly, it can be described as follows: a British army under General John Burgoyne was to advance south from Canada, down the Hudson River valley to Albany, thus cutting New England off from the rest of the colonies. In the Middle Colonies, General Howe was to keep Washington busy in order to prevent him from sending any help to the patriots facing Burgoyne; and, importantly, he was to use his army to assist the Canadian invasion force in completing its mission. This task would involve moving at least part of his command north to link up with Burgoyne. With the link made, the divided colonies could be dealt with separately and the rebellion crushed piecemeal. Had it been properly executed, the plan had real possibilities. Unfortunately for the British, however, orders to the appropriate Commanders were either unclear, misinterpreted or late, and a plan requiring precise coordination went awry. Howe never sent the required help to Burgoyne, who, fighting alone, was ultimately forced to surrender at Saratoga. A major reason that Howe never sent the required aid to his fellow general was Middlebrook. For while Burgoyne was advancing from Canada, Howe had decided to attack the rebel capitol at Philadelphia. Now, a simple look at a map shows that if you hold New Brunswick the shortest way to Philadelphia is an overland march across New Jersey. Had Howe done this, he would have taken the city in plenty of time to have sent help north to Burgoyne when it became clear to everyone that the northern attack had run into real trouble. but the fact is that Howe was not free to march across the state. Had he tried, Washington could have moved south from Middlebrook, fallen on the British rear, and cut their communications with New York. Far from being the attacker, Howe could well have faced a disaster himself, much less have been in a position to help Burgoyne. From the British point of view, there were only two ways around the dilemma: drive Washington out of Middlebrook proceeding only then across New Jersey, or attack Philadelphia from the south. This second choice meant withdrawing the British army from New Jersey (which is what Washington wanted them to do anyway), loading it on transports and sailing it down the Jersey coast, up Delaware or Chesapeake Bay, and marching on the city from a point with secure lines of communication or routes of escape. Such an alternative, while feasible, was time consuming--it could be used only at the risk of taking Philadelphia too late (if they were able to take it at all) to help Burgoyne if he needed it. Nevertheless, it was the option Howe chose. Howe almost had to. His engineer officers looked into the possibility of storming Washington’s Middlebrook fortification and thus clearing the way for a march through central New Jersey. But their conclusion was definite: any such attempt would be a bloody affair indeed if Washington chose to fight instead of run. Howe, who had seen his men slaughtered when they attacked uphill at Bunker Hill in 1775, had no desire to order another such assault. And even had he wanted to make the attack, Howe knew that he could not easily replace the losses he would certainly have sustained, So, after a vein attempt, to draw the rebels out of the hills to fight on his terms, Howe made his fateful decision: in the early summer of 1777 he evacuated New Jersey and set sail for Philadelphia. The trip took the British over a month, and when in late August, Howe finally received explicit instructions to help Burgoyne, but it was too late, he was too far south to get reinforcements north in time, and he was himself facing Washington, who had marched easily from Middlebrook to contest him. Howe's decision not to attack Middlebrook, and to move south by water instead, was therefore a major factor in the defeat of Burgoyne--a defeat now recognized as the military and diplomatic turning point of the war. When asked after the campaign why he did not move on the Continental Army on the heights of Middlebrook, Lord Howe could only answer that to have done so would have been catastrophic. The loss of Burgoyne’s men far to the north was thus unattributable in large part to the posting of patriot forces in central New Jersey. Although it was never attacked, then the encampment at Middlebrook must rank as one of the most important sites left to us from the age of the American Revolution.
Address given by Mark E. LenderJuly 4, 1976